School Safety
School shooters: What we know so far.
Insights about school attackers
Unfortunately, this past month the U.S. suffered another tragic school shooting in Uvalde, Texas. On May 24, 2022, an 18-year-old gunman entered Robb Elementary School and proceeded to kill 19 students and two teachers over the course of an hour. The victims ranged in age from 9-to-48-years-old, with the majority of them being children. While we will undoubtedly learn more about the victims, the shooting, and the perpetrator in the coming weeks to months, there are some things we already know about school attackers in general. By sharing this knowledge, we hope to prevent future tragedies. Contrary to media messages, school shooters do no simply snap and go on violent sprees. The following section includes some details about the growing research on school attackers.
First, it is important to note that school shootings are still relatively rare. Over 99% of school threats do not result in actual school attacks (School Threat Assessment, n.d.). However, an event can be rare and still cause destructive, painful consequences. Within the clinical and law enforcement communities, such events are sometimes referred to as “low frequency/high density,” meaning that such an event is uncommon but still capable of causing devastating loss and destruction when they do occur. With that being said, recent data indicate that school shootings now occur monthly in the U.S. with a variety of consequences (Towers et al., 2015). Below are some insights about school attackers.
There is no such thing as a school shooter profile.
Shooters come from diverse backgrounds, varying in age, sex, race, education, and class. Therefore, trying to identify potential shooters according to a profile, standard, or prototype is unlikely to be helpful.
A review of 41 school shootings by the U.S. Secret Service reveals that shooters come from diverse backgrounds (National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC), 2019). They varied in age, sex, race, education, and class (NTAC, 2019). Therefore, trying to identify potential shooters according to a profile, standard, or prototype is unlikely to be helpful. Such an approach will likely result in the misclassification of some students as threatening and other youth experiencing legitimate crises being missed or lost. This finding also stresses the importance of focusing on behaviors rather than personality traits or characteristics. Of note, school shooters have traditionally been male.
Many attackers were motivated by perceived grievances.
While attackers reported various motivations, the U.S. Secret Service found that many were fueled by the belief that they had been wronged by classmates, school staff, and romantic partners (NTAC, 2019). The key here is the attacker’s perception that they were wronged as opposed to the reality. Consequently, it is important to ask youth in distress about their feelings and thoughts about situations and not simply rely on witness reports. This also stresses the importance that communities work actively to combat school bullying. Other motivations frequently cited included a desire to kill and achieve notoriety/infamy.
School attackers used firearms, oftentimes taken from home.
Many had expressed concern about the attacker beforehand.
Contrary to the belief that attackers simply snap, many individuals attracted attention beforehand. Students are particularly well positioned to see emerging problems. Students are sensitive to changes in their friends and classmates. The U.S. Secret Service study found that many school attackers made threats to friends and classmates beforehand (NTAC, 2021). Consequently, students and teachers should remain vigilant and educated about potential school attack warning signs. Additionally, destigmatization of youth alerting adults and authorities about troubled kids is important (i.e., “stop snitching”). Youth should feel empowered to share important safety information. A confidential information system may help alleviate student anxiety about alerting others.
Most attackers had prior contact with a mental health professional.
Many attackers had histories of mental health, including issues like behavioral, neurological, and psychological difficulties (NTAC, 2019). Many attackers had histories of depression and suicide (NTAC, 2019). Of note, attackers did not present with severe forms of mental illness, like schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, which can cause one to hallucinate and become delusional. Given this finding, mental health professionals are in an excellent position to be part of a broad intervention strategy. This finding should not be seen as equating all mental health requests with violence or dangerousness. The overwhelming majority of the mentally ill are non-violent, a finding which includes those suffering from more severe conditions (e.g., psychosis, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia).
Schools should intervene before legal consequences are warranted.
In an examination of averted school attacks, or situations wherein a shooter’s plot was thwarted beforehand, U.S. Secret Service recommended that schools and communities develop assessment teams that can intervene when early warning signs first show and before any laws are broken (NTAC, 2021). In other words, schools should not wait for a distressed youth to break the law before intervening. Waiting for a youth to commit a crime or punishable offense could result in important prevention time being wasted.
Some shootings appear to be copycats.
Researchers have found that there is a substantial risk of copycat attacks in the two weeks following a major shooting (Towers et. al., 2015). This phenomenon is sometimes called the contagion effect. In order to combat this copycat phenomenon, communities and other stakeholders may want to call on media outlets to institute a “white-out” regarding a killer’s identity. With this strategy, important information about victims and school safety is broadcast but specific details about the killer are omitted to prevent inspiring others.
Suspending potential attackers from school is not enough.
Suspending potential attackers from school is an inadequate response and can produce a false sense of security (NTAC, 2021). Outside of school, distressed youth may be left unmonitored and forgotten about. Additionally, just because a student is prohibited from attending school does not mean that he is actually physically prevented from returning to campus. Potential alternatives include an emergency psychiatric assessment, change of classrooms, inclusion of parents in prevention, and greater school supervision (i.e., counselor check-ins).
Many attackers were fixated on violence and weapons.
The U.S. Secret Service recommends that distressed youth be asked about interest in violence and weapons (NTAC, 2019). However, it is important that we not pathologize a normal interest in guns or violent historical events. The key is whether the youth can express a reasonable explanation for his or her interest. There is big difference between a youth that is highly knowledgeable about firearms and comes from a long line of family hunters compared to a youth that spends his free time heavily researching Nazis and identifies with Adolf Hitler.
Ask your child’s school about how they address threatening behavior.
Concerned parents are encouraged to ask their child’s school about how they address threatening student behavior. Additionally, an increasing number of schools have threat assessment teams, which combine school resource officers, psychologists, social workers, and educators, to manage potential issues. Parents should ask their school districts about whether such interventions are in place to address developing threats.
Learn more about school safety
How to talk to children about violence
National Threat Assessment Center. (2019). Protecting America’s Schools: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Targeted School Violence. U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security.
National Threat Assessment Center. (2021). Averting Targeted School Violence: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Plots against Schools. U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security.
Towers S, Gomez-Lievano A, Khan M, Mubayi A, Castillo-Chavez C (2015) Contagion in Mass Killings and School Shootings. PLOS ONE 10(7): e0117259. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0117259
School Threat Assessment. (n.d.) Retrieved, June 14, 2022, from https://www.schoolta.com/research
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